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APPARENTLY SUBSTANTIAL, ODDLY
HOLLOW: THE ENIGMATIC
PRACTICE OF JUSTICE

Heidi Li Feldman*
PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS. By
William H. Simon. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1998.

THE

Pp. 253. $35.

INTRODUCTION
The Practice ofJustice: A Theory of Lawyers' Ethics, by William
H. Simon,1 is one of the most thoughtful and important books in
legal theory - not just legal ethics - published in the past ten
years. Like David Luban's seminal contribution to legal ethics,
Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study, 2 published a decade ago,
Simon's book is a deliberate rival to accounts of lawyers' profes
sional responsibility that begin with a command to zealous advo
cacy, end with a prohibition on outright illegal conduct, and offer
nothing in between. Authors and commentators have grown in
creasingly dissatisfied with this as the basic structure of legal ethics,3
but to date, no alternative model has gained widespread endorse
ment. Other than Anthony Kronman's The Lost Lawyer and
Luban's Lawyers and Justice, I know of no other full-scale attempt
to develop a profession-wide alternative to the all-zeal/no
unlawfulness model. We need as many serious attempts as possible
if those of us interested in legal ethics are to fashion an enduring,
plausible theory of how lawyers should act and who they should be.
Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B. 1982, Brown;
-Ed. The author thanks John
Hynes for his assistance in preparing this piece and David Luban and Robin West for reading
and reacting to it and for sharing their own reviews of The Practice ofJustice.
1. Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of Public Interest Law, Stanford Law
School.
2. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETiiICAL STUDY (1988).
3. See, e.g., ANTiioNY T. KRoNMAN, THE LoST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF A LEGAL
PROFESSION (1993); Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 1
(1988); Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., The Future ofLegal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239 (1991); David
Luban, Stevens's Professionalism and Ours, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 297 (1996); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural
World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 5 (1996); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104
HARV. L. REv. 468 (1990); Fred C. Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, 65 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 169 (1997). Although they are motivated by different concerns, each of these
authors discusses the shortcomings of the zealous advocacy model and argues that it cannot
serve as a complete or compelling theory of legal ethics.
*

D. 1990, Ph.D. (Philosophy) 1993, University of Michigan.
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Each worthy effort teaches us what we should or should not include
in such a theory, even if we do not wholly adopt the author's propo
sal. Lawyers and Justice taught that we should be suspicious of a
legal ethics founded on role morality. The Lost Lawyer focused at
tention on the centrality of high quality practical reasoning in good
lawyering. William H. Simon's The Practice ofJustice reminds us to
mine the rich resources of jurisp.i;udence when building a solid the
ory of legal ethics, and to watch out if we ignore the jurisprudential
foundations upon which our theory rests.
Simon skillfulyl and persuasively criticizes what he calls the
"Dominant View" of legal ethics, by revealing the inadequacies of
its jurisprudence.4 According to the Dominant View, which is a va
riety of the all-zeal/no-unlawfulness model, "the lawyer must - or
at least may - pursue any goal of the client through any arguably
legal course of action and assert any nonfrivolous legal claim" (p.
7). Simon demonstrates the Dominant View's dependence upon
formalist commitments to libertarianism and legal positivism.
Then, he undermines these commitments, clearing the way for
Simon's preferred theory of legal ethics, the Contextual View,
which holds that "the lawyer should take such actions as, consider
ing the relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem likely to
promote justice" (p. 9). Unfortunately, the Contextual View suffers
from some serious problems, difficulties that become particularly
apparent when we imagine putting the Contextual View into prac
tice. An oddity of The Practice ofJustice is that the flaws in Simon's
positive account of legal ethics seem to be ones he should have eas
ily spotted. As I will argue below, Simon overlooks a normative
vacuum in his theory. Since his critique of the Dominant View
reveals its inadequacy if we do not accept its normative engine, lib
ertarianism, one might have expected Simon to make sure his own
account possessed a plausible, workable source of normativity.
Simon presents the Contextual View as if justice will fill this role.
But as Simon construes justice, it cannot play the part.
The shortcomings in Simon's approach to justice relate to a
more general flaw in Simon's approach to ethics. Simon seems
insensitive to the idea that ethical requirements should be instruc
tive, compelling, and authoritative. Immanuel Kant's ethics high
light this sort of categoricity, which insists that ethical requirements
are nonoptional and do not vary according to personal interpreta4. Simon also rejects the "Public Interest View," which he claims urges that "law should
be applied in accordance with its purposes, and litigation should be conducted so as to pro
mote informed resolution on the substantive merits." P. 8. But his main target is the
Dominant View, and I restrict my discussion to Simon's critique of it and his advancement of
the Contextual View.
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tion.5 Simon objects strenuously to a different sort of categoricity
- a tendency to conceive ethical demands unduly broadly, without
nuance (p. 9). But in his zeal to condemn this sort of categoricity,
he overlooks Kantian categoricity entirely. Simon's conception of
justice strips that value of much of its normative power. Simon's
blindness to Kantian categoricity makes it seem that he envisions a
lawyers' ethics without normative authority of any kind.
THE FAILINGS OF

THE

DOMINANT VIEW

Perceptively and adroitly, Simon demonstrates that in its blend
of libertarianism and legal positivism, the Dominant View is a
throwback to an earlier school of legal thought, sometimes called
formalism and, sometimes, Classical Legal Thought.6 Epitomized
in Lochner v. New York, 7 classical formalism imported the liberta
rian conception of freedom as protection from unwarranted en
croachments by the state or by other individuals. According to
libertarianism, the state or other people are only justified in inter
fering with an individual's pursuit of her own ends if she consents to
the interference, or if in her pursuit she interferes with others' like
pursuit without their consent. In addition to its libertarianism,
classical formalism included a form of legal positivism, conceiving
of law as both conceptually and substantively independent of other
social, political, and intellectual realms. Formalist judges wrote as if
the content and application of precedent cases were transparent
and self-evident. These jurists did not overtly consult or invoke
moral, political, economic, and historical facts or theories to justify
their interpretations of the law. For classical formalists, interpreta
tion, like the law itself, was obvious.
5. See lMMANuEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF TiiE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 76 (H.J.
Paton trans., 1948) (1785) ("Unless we wish to deny to the concept of morality all truth and
all relation to a possible object, we cannot dispute that its law is of such widespread signifi
cance as to hold, not merely for men, but for all rational beings as such
not merely subj ect
to contingent conditions and exceptions, but with absolute necessity."). Ludwig Wittgenstein
assumed ethics possessed this sort of absolute quality, and he argued that this implies that
ethics must be independent of matters of fact. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Lecture on Ethics,"
in STEPHEN DARWALL ET AL., MORAL DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE 65, 66-68 (1997). Philippa
Foot has famously argued against the need for or presence of Kantian categoricity in ethics.
See generally Philippa Foot, Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives, in VIRTUES
AND VICES 157 (1978). John McDowell argues against Foot's conclusion that moral impera·
tives are hypothetical, while at the same time offering an alternative categoricity to that of
Kantian ethics. John McDowell, I. Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?, 52
PROCEEDINGS OF TiiE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY, SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME 13, 13 (1978).
6. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870·
1960, at 10 (1992); Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. P1rr. L. REv. 1, 2 n.6
(1983); Andrew M. Jacobs, God Save This Postmodern Court: The Death of Necessity and the
Transformation of the Supreme Court's Overruling Rhetoric, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 1119, 1122-24
(1995); Duncan Kennedy, Towards an Historical Understanding ofLegal Consciousness: The
Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 REs. L. & Soc. 3 (1980).
7. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
-
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Although American classical formalism did not include an ac
count of legal ethics, Simon is dead right when he claims that the
Dominant View of legal ethics is the account that follows from
classical formalism (p. 28). The Dominant View instructs the law
yer that she may or must pursue the client's interests via any argua
bly legal course of action. The law by itself sets the only limit on
what the lawyer may do. David Wilkins, another current and im
portant legal ethicist, presents this as "the boundary claim."S Like
Simon, Wilkins observes that this image of the law as boundary
setting relies on a sense of the law as an external force, exerting
influence on the lawyer independent of her own or anybody else's
moral, political, economic, or historical views.9 This is the formalist
vision of law's separateness. Under the Dominant View, the lawyer
barricades the client's rightful sphere of autonomy by pressing the
client's lawful claims. Since the law itself is not moral, political, or
economic, the lawyer is not aiding the client in any illegitimate im
position on anybody else's freedom; but anything short of pressing
to the boundaries of the law would mean that the lawyer is illegiti
mately imposing her own views on the client. The lawyer facilitates
the client's freedom as per the libertarianism of classical formalism.
Simon rejects both the libertarianism and the legal positivism of
classical formalism. He faults libertarianism for its cramped con
ception of freedom and its elevation of this form of freedom over
all other moral goods (p. 36). Simon rejects legal positivism be
cause it cannot sustain the strong law/nonlaw distinction it draws (p.
37). Simon's attack draws heavily on jurisprudential ideas ad
vanced by Ronald Dworkin and by Critical Legal Studies scholars,
debts Simon acknowledges heartily (p. 247). The key premise of his
argument is that it is impossible to interpret the law, and therefore
to identify it, without incorporating moral, political, and economic
values into one's assessment. These values, however, do not stem
from a sovereign's enactment, one feature positivism relies upon to
distinguish law from nonlaw (pp. 38-39). Simon advances other ar
guments against legal positivism, but this is the main one, and it is
convincing. 10

THE NORMATIVITY AND PRACTICAL GUIDANCE OF ROBUST
ETHICAL THEORY
As the subtitle of The Practice of Justice tells us, Simon offers a
theory of lawyers' ethics. Simon insightfully draws our attention to

8. David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARv. L. REv. 468, 471 (1990).
9. See id. at 472.
10. For a fuller and quite helpful discussion of Simon's Dworkinian arguments against
legal positivism, see Robin West, The Zealous Advocacy ofJustice in a Less Than Ideal Legal
World, 61 Stan L. Rev. 973, 977-79 (1999).

1476

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 97:1472

the fact that such a theory can rely upon jurisprudence - philoso
phy of law - as well as moral and political philosophy. He does
this by showing how the Dominant View generates its normative
ethics - its basic tenet of how a lawyer ought, morally, to behave
- from its jurisprudence (libertarianism plus legal positivism) .
And his own strategy for generating an alternative normative ethics
for lawyers depends primarily on substituting a different jurispru
dence for the one implicit in the Dominant View. The key difficulty
here, however, is that a jurisprudence without a robust moral phi
losophy cannot effectively guide ethical conduct. A robust moral
philosophy is not necessarily a correct moral theory, but it has at
least two features: (at least minimally) plausible accounts of (i) the
source of moral normativity and (ii) what counts as an appropriate
response to this normative source.
The Doriiinant View relies on libertarianism as its robust moral
philosophy, a point Simon himself makes. In libertarianism, the
source of moral normativity is the individual. Responding to the
normativity of the individual calls for leaving her free to choose and
act as she pleases. Other major moral theories offer alternative
sources of moral normativity. In Kantianism, the source is the
moral law itself; we respond properly to this normative source by
exercising pure practical reason to figure out exactly what it calls
for us to do in any particular situation.11 According to utilitarian
ism, the good - in the form of human happiness - is the source of
normativity, and it bids us to act so as to maximize its existence. 12
In classic virtue theory, human telos or purpose supplies normativ
ity, and we acknowledge this source appropriately by shaping our
characters so as to fulfill our telos.13
People's reactions to the plausibility of each theory's source of
normativity vary; even among those who endorse the same source,
debate arises over exactly what strategies and tactics constitute cor
rect responses. But Kantianism, utilitarianism, and virtue theory and, to a lesser degree, libertarianism - have identified sufficiently
believable sources of normativity and made adequate recommenda
tions about the right response to these sources to gain adherents
and expositors. If Simon's Contextual View is to qualify as an eth11. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRAcnCAL REASON 35-36, 87 (H.W. Cassirer
trans., Marquette Univ. Press 1998) (1788); IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE MET
APHYSICS OF MORALS 12-14 (James W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publg. Co. 1981) (1785); see
also LEWIS WHITE BECK, A COMMENTARY ON KANT's CRITIQUE OFPRACTICAL R£4son219
(1960); CHRISTINE M. KoRSGAARD, CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 77 (1996).
12. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCflON TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 11-16 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Univ. of London Athlone Press 1970)
(1789); JoHN STUART MILL, Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTA·
TIVE GOVERNMENT 1, 8 (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1951) (1861).
13. See ARISTOTLE, Nichomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WoRKS OF ARISTOTLE 935, 94243 (Richard McKeon ed., W.D. Ross trans., Random House 1941).
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ics, even if only an ethics for lawyers, it has to identify a source of
normativity and indicate what counts as the right sort of response to
that source. If the Contextual View is to hold any promise, both
source and response have to be at least minimally plausible.
According to the Contextual View of lawyers' ethics, "lawyers
should take those actions that, considering the relevant circum
stances of the particular case, seem likely to promote justice" (p.
138). The Contextual View defines justice as the "basic values of
the legal system," and it "subsumes many layers of more concrete
norms" (p. 138). In short, justice is equivalent to legal merit (p.
138). Before analyzing the ethical aspects of this view, let us
examine its jurisprudence.
Instead of a formalist theory of interpretation, according to
which the meaning of legal rules and standards is transparently
available from an examination of precedent, Simon adopts a sub
stantive, purposivist theory, according to which the meaning of
legal rules and standards is not evident simply from textual exami
nation but must be ascertained in light of the basic values and goals
of the legal system (p. 82). Because these goals and values include
moral components, law cannot be walled off from morality (p. 85).
Without reference to the morality incorporated into the law's basic
values, we cannot even identify what the law is. Simon calls this a
substantive conception of the law (p. 82). Substantive conceptions
come in many stripes, depending upon what one takes the law's
basic values to be. Simon mentions natural law, libertarianism, util
itarianism, wealth-maximization, Rawlsianism, virtue theories, and
Dworkinian coherentism as substantive conceptions of American
law (p. 82).
Simon's purposivist jurisprudence includes a metaphysics - a
theory of what the law is - and an epistemology - a theory of
how we should identify what the law is. Metaphysically, the law is
infused with moral, political, and economic values. Epistemologi
cally, we should consider these values in our efforts to decide what
the law is, means, and requires of us. Simon's metaphysics and
epistemology of law are mutually supporting. The reason we
cannot readily know the law without making reference to its basic
values is because the law does not exist apart from its basic values.
Correlatively, because the law has built into it basic values, we
cannot easily identify the law unless we appreciate its basic values.
The relationship between what the law is and how we know the law
is not one of logical connection or conceptual constitutiveness. In
principle, we could have an interpretive method that would enable
us to identify the law without ever considering, acknowledging, or
noticing the law's basic values, or even postulating that it has any,
even if the law itself consists of moral and political values in part.
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Likewise, we could use a method that supposes and considers basic
values to identify the law even if, as it turned out, the law itself does
not include any basic values. But, pragmatically speaking, if our
best theory of legal interpretation instructs us to consider basic val
ues that seem to be part of the law and if our best understanding of
what law is includes basic values, then each of these recommends
the other. In other words, if the substantivist's metaphysics of the
law holds, his interpretive method promises to be helpful; and if his
interpretive method proves helpful, this bolsters his metaphysical
claims.
Simon's account of substantive conceptions of law makes the
Dominant View's jurisprudence into a closet substantive view.
Since the Dominant View relies on a libertarian morality to expli
cate and justify both zealous advocacy and its legal limits, the
Dominant View deviates from its own commitment to legal positiv
ism (p. 43). Simon's argument allows us to extend to legal ethics
the observation that, appearances notwithstanding, law is morally
and politically value-laden - an observation made by legal realists
and their intellectual descendants.
It follows from Simon's own critique of formalism that any
theory that ties lawyers' ethics to the law is ultimately going to have
to put something in the placeholder occupied by libertarianism in
the Dominant View. If substantivism about law is right, then any
ethical theory that requires lawyers to interpret or identify the law
will have to take a position on the fundamental values that are part
of the law on a substantivist view, or it will have to delegate respon
sibility for ascertaining those values to some other theory or author
ity and justify this assignment. Simon seems to choose the second
path. Simon does not offer an extended account of the moral and
political content of the law. Instead, he claims that the law's funda
mental purpose is justice and he equates justice with legal merit.
This allows him to argue that anybody able to reason accurately
about justice or legal merit is an appropriate delegate for the task of
filling in the law's substantive moral and political content (p. 51).
Since lawyers are trained to reason about legal merit
if not jus
tice - they are especially suited for the job.
By equating justice with legal merit, Simon could mean that
whatever legal positions hold water under our actual legal rules and
standards are consistent with justice. Or he could mean that
whenever our legal rules and standards appear to permit positions
inconsistent with the requirements of justice (as understood in
dependent of the apparent legal merits), we have misunderstood
the law and must correct our identification of legal merit. This de
scriptive equation of legal merit and justice is blatantly false. It
cannot be that whatever our current law permits always coincides
-
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with or constitutes justice. At any given moment in history, the law
permits activities that run counter to our best and most deeply held
ideas about justice. Examples of divergence abound. A tort regime
that made it virtually impossible for injured, relatively poor workers
to recover any damages from their negligent, relatively wealthy
employers did not even comport with contemporary views about
justice.14 A constitutional law that allowed, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, race-based segregation struck even contemporary par
ticipants as unjust.1s
It isn't that on occasion our ideas about justice could turn out to
be wrong and the law's permissions just; it's that it seems utterly
absurd to suppose that this could be the case on every occasion
where law and justice seem to conflict. Most of the time, Simon
himself appreciates the absurdity of the strong descriptive equation.
Hence, he devotes a large portion of the book to justifying nullifica
tion, which he argues is not really nullification but, when done
rightly, is correction of a misunderstanding of what the law is (pp.
86-98). If legal merit equals justice, and seemingly legal conduct is
actually unjust, then nullification serves to realign law and justice,
thereby replacing inauthentic law with the genuine article. Setting
aside the worry that this conception of nullification makes it impos
sible to ever say that there is unjust law - because it seems that on
this approach if putative law is unjust it is not really law - this
conception of nullification presents a particular problem for
Simon's Contextual View.
Remember: Simon maintains that lawyers are especially suita
ble delegates for the task of ascertaining the moral content of the
law, because they are trained to identify positions with legal merit.
But if genuine legal merit depends on an accurate understanding of
justice, then lawyers are only especially good delegates if they are
especially good at judging justice. Legal training could only make
one especially good at this if the legal system in which one was
trained did in fact overlap extensively with the requirements of jus
tice, or if the style of legal thinking one learned was a style that was
either the same as, or a useful contributor to, good reasoning about
justice. I have already explained why we should seriously doubt
that our current legal system overlaps justice thoroughly enough to
assume that those well acquainted with the law are thereby well

14. See THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECilNG SOLDIERS AND MoTIIERS: THE PoLmCAL
ORIGINS OF SocIAL PouCY IN TIIE UNITED STATES 286-302 (1992) (describing the co=on

law doctrines preventing recovery: judicial and legislative efforts to modify these doctrines,
which were only moderately successful; and the tepid administrative schemes meant to rem
edy the problem of workplace injury).
15. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 554-64 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Justice Harlan arguing, in dissent, that Louisiana's race-based
segregation laws were inconsistent with both guarantees of liberty and equality).
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acquainted with justice. As for whether those skilled in legal analy
sis are thereby skilled in judging justice, at minimum, this is an open
question. First, there is the issue of whether a method of thought
learned with regard to a domain (law) that most probably deviates
from justice at least sometimes is likely to be useful for reaching
accurate conclusions about justice. Second, there is the problem
that motivates Simon's book in the first place. Many lawyers seem
to feel that what their jobs require of them is, at worst, inconsistent
with justice and, at best, irrelevant to it (p. 1). They do not qualify
this observation with the caveat that when they are engaged in pure
legal deliberation - as opposed to, say, rainmaking or document
handling
then they sense a convergence between lawyering and
deliberating well about justice. This suggests that those most
engaged in the practice of legal reasoning do not perceive them
selves as especially well suited to the task of identifying the require
ments of justice - the task the Contextual View assigns them.
Simon does not actually bluntly tell lawyers to figure out the just
outcome in each matter in which they participate and then act ac
cordingly. He recommends procedural guidelines to assist lawyers
in deciding what justice requires of them in any given situation.
Simon suggests these guidelines as antidotes to three tensions he
claims recur in legal ethics problems (p. 139). One is the tension
between substance and procedure, which "arises from the lawyer's
sense, on the one hand, of the limitations of her judgment regarding
the substantive merit of a matter and, on the other hand, of the
limitations of the established procedures for determining the mat
ter" (p. 139). Another is the tension between purpose and form,
which arises because a lawyer deciding how she ought to act under
the law can concentrate on the purely formal features of a legal rule
or principle, or she can consider the purposes that underlie these
features (pp. 144-45). Because formal and purposive interpreta
tions of the same law do not always dictate the same conduct, the
lawyer must mediate between the two when deciding what to do.
The third tension is between broad framing and narrow framing.
As Simon uses the term, framing is the description of the issue at
hand (p. 149). Often, an issue and its resolution will look different
depending upon whether we frame the issue with a few characteris
tics of the situation or with many (p. 149).
For each tension, Simon suggests a guideline for resolving it in
particular situations:
(I) To mediate between substance and procedure, the lawyer
should ask herself whether she can count on the relevant
procedures to achieve the correct substantive outcome.
"[T]he more reliable the relevant procedures and institu
tions, the less direct responsibility the lawyer need assume
for the substantive justice of the resolution . . . " (p. 140).
-
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(II) To reconcile form and purpose, the attorney should weigh
the clarity and significance of the purpose against the for
mulaic requirements of the law. "[T]he clearer and more
fundamental the relevant purposes, the more the lawyer
should consider herself bound by them; the less clear and
more problematic the relevant purposes, the more justified
the lawyer is in treating the relevant norms formally" (pp.
145-46).
(III) To decide which characteristics to include in her framing of
an issue, the lawyer should respect three standards of rele
vance: (i) A consideration should be included in the frame
if it fits the most plausible interpretation of a law's scope. If
a law regulates narrowly, a lawyer should frame the issues
that arise under it narrowly; if the law regulates broadly, the
lawyer should frame it broadly (pp. 150-51); (ii) If a consid
eration is likely to have substantive practical influence on
the resolution of a matter, then it should be included in the
frame of the issue (p. 151); (iii) If a lawyer cannot compe
tently handle an issue framed broadly - due, perhaps to
limitations on her knowledge, skill, or resources - she
should frame the issue more narrowly (p. 151).
These guidelines and the interrelationships between them raise
myriad issues. Whatever else we may say about them, one thing is
certain: they do not provide a lawyer with a substantive account of
justice. Yet the first guideline - counseling a lawyer to deviate
from unreliable procedures to achieve substantive justice - clearly
presupposes that the lawyer can locate a substantive account. She
needs contentful principles of justice to assess the overall reliability
of the relevant procedures and institutions (do they usually achieve
just results?) and to decide whether to trust these procedures and
institutions in the instant matter (how likely is it that they will
achieve the just result this time?).
The other two guidelines also presuppose that the lawyer pos
sesses at least some features of a substantive account of justice. Ac
cording to the second guideline, a lawyer should treat the law
formulaically only to the degree that its substantive purposes are
unclear. If we accept Simon's central jurisprudential assertion that the law's fundamental substantive purpose is justice - then we
have to accept that lawyers need to know something about the con
tent of justice to judge when to interpret law more purposively, less
formally. Simon never claims that every law's only purpose is jus
tice, so it would not be right to say that the second guideline only
has impact if a lawyer has a complete account of substantive justice
in hand. The balance between purposive and formalistic interpreta
tion could be struck according to the clarity and significance of a
law's purposes other than justice. Nevertheless, because justice is
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the most fundamental purpose of all law, according to Simon, un
certainty about substantive justice will always tilt the balance to
ward formalistic treatment - an odd result for a theory motivated
by a rejection of formalism in legal interpretation.
The third guideline also implicates substantive justice. This
guideline specifies three criteria of relevance to which a lawyer
should refer when framing an ethical problem. The first standard of
relevance says that the broadness or narrowness of frames should
vary with the broadness or narrowness of the scope of the law
involved in the problem. Ascertaining the scope of a law, however,
generally requires understanding its purpose or animating values
(again, a lesson of American Legal Realism, reiterated by contem
porary scholarly descendants of that movement). If justice is al
ways one of the purposes or basic values informing a law, an
attorney cannot settle the scope of the law without some substan
tive conception of justice, and the way the law in question relates to
achieving substantive justice. The second standard of relevance
looks to the empirical difference a variation in frame would make
to the resolution of the issue. Shifting the frame might prompt a
lawyer to consider different laws possibly applicable to the situa
tion. This potentiality could quickly push the lawyer into having to
analyze the purpose, meaning, or reach of different laws in order to
decide which ones apply under which frames. Once a lawyer must
engage in this analysis she needs - again, according to Simon's
view of the law - a substantive conception of justice. The third
standard of relevance does not presuppose that a lawyer referring
to it has a substantive conception of justice in mind. But it does
seem to presuppose some substantive ideas about justice that Si
mon apparently holds but does not defend. This third standard di
rects a lawyer to narrow the frame of an ethical problem according
to shortfalls in her knowledge or competence that would make it
difficult to resolve the problem if it was framed more broadly. I do
not find this advice intuitively compelling. It seems to tell a lawyer
that it is always better to stick to her knitting in the face of uncer
tainty and scarce resources, rather than risk acknowledging a more
serious ethical problem and bungling it. But this advice is only ap
pealing if we think that lawyers should be consistently risk averse
about attempting to achieve justice when their own knowledge and
competence is limited. At first glance, this proposition does not
seem obviously correct. It seems to depend upon a further claim
about the relative merits of ambitious but botched ethical problem
solving versus a potential sacrifice of justice. Perhaps it also relies
on a claim about the likelihood of bungling in the face of uncer
tainty and scarce resources. The first of these two claims is clearly a
substantive moral claim that may belong within a substantive
theory of justice, yet it is not a claim that Simon defends.
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I do not fault Simon for propounding a theory of lawyers' ethics
that a lawyer cannot use unless she possesses a substantive concep
tion of justice. But a lawyer acting under the Contextual View will
have to arrive at a substantive conception of justice somehow.
Simon seems untroubled by this. Yet he ought to be concerned. It
is hard to develop an acceptable - let alone a correct - concep
tion of justice. Even if an attorney does not start from scratch, but
instead decides to adopt a conception of justice from an established
philosophical or religious tradition, it will be hard for her to select
wisely and with full appreciation of an established conception's
content.
Of course, this picture of an individual attorney surveying estab
lished conceptions of justice or carefully developing her own is
rather fanciful, in any event. An attorney who approaches ethical
problems according to the Contextual View is unlikely to have the
time or training to select or work out a substantive conception of
justice. She is much more likely to consult her intuitions about jus
tice on a case by case basis. This scenario raises concerns about the
soundness of the Contextual View when put into practice.
There are several potential pitfalls for an ethical regime that de
pends on decisionmakers unsystematically consulting their intu
itions for its success. The decisions of such actors will only be as
sound as their ethical intuitions. But one key motivation for devel
oping any theory of ethics, including a theory of lawyers' ethics, is
doubt about the soundness of decisionmakers' pre-philosophical in
tuitions. Such doubt becomes especially acute in contexts where a
decisionmaker's instincts about justice might be distorted by self
interest or other morally irrelevant factors. Practicing attorneys op
erate in such a context. Both their livelihoods and their profes
sional relationships can depend upon decisions they make about
ethical problems. When one's position, income, or friendships can
tum on one's ethical choices, it is hard to trust, and perhaps even to
know, one's intuitions about justice.

CATEGORICAL PRECEPTS AND THE PROBLEM OF
SPECIAL PLEADING
The Contextual View does not necessarily restrict an attorney to
her own intuitions about justice as she decides what to do about an
ethical problem. But Simon's absolute resistance to what he calls
the "categorical" seems to inhibit him from advocating any more
systematic conception of justice. Equally, it seeins to lead him to
oppose any ethical theory that concentrates on developing the
outlook of lawyers so that we might have more confidence in the
soundness of their untutored intuitions about justice.
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Simon describes categorical decisionmaking and categorical
norms as follows:

[B]oth the Dominant and the Public Interest views, for all the differ
ences in their priorities, adopt a common style of decisionmaking that
I call categorical. Such decisionmaking severely restricts the range of
considerations the decisionmaker may take into account when she
confronts a particular problem; a rigid rule dictates a particular re
sponse in the presence of a small number of factors. The deci
sionmaker has no discretion to consider factors that are not specified
or to evaluate specified factors in ways other than those prescribed by
the rule. [p. 9]
Categorical norms - like the all-but-absolute confidentiality guaran
tee and the Dominant View's general "arguably legal" norm - re
quire simpler judgments based on a narrower range of factual
considerations than do contextual norms. [pp. 69-70]
Simon also writes that "categorical norms require less demand
ing interpretive efforts than contextual ones" (p. 74); he claims that
the legal "profession has promulgated an ideology, backed by disci
plinary rules and sanctions, that mandates unreflective, mechanical,
categorical judgment rather than practical reason" (p. 23; emphasis
added). Simon argues that popular films such as The Talk of the
Town and The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance reveal the stunted
psyches of those lawyers "disposed to . . . categorical normative
judgment" (p. 94). On Simon's interpretation, both films' main
characters "exemplify rigidity associated with limited experience of
the world. . . . Their rigidity takes two forms that the movies treat
as analogous. One is sexual: they are awkward with women. The
other is intellectual . . . . Their reverence for the law is sanctimoni
ous and naYve" (p. 94). Simon adds:

[T]he movies see the disposition toward categorical judgment as a
form of emotional and intellectual maturity. In this condition, people
deny or shield themselves from the real world because they are afraid
of its complexities and contradictions. Maturity involves acknowledg
ing these complexities and contradictions by abandoning categorical
normative judgment without becoming cynical. [p. 95]
All in all, Simon paints a complex picture of categoricity. It
involves exceptionless rules that specify the circumstances of their
own applicability. Somebody following such rules need not and
may not exercise judgment about their applicability when the speci
fied circumstances obtain. It conjures up timidity and immaturity
analogous to - perhaps even connected to - sexual naivete.
This is a somewhat idiosyncratic take on categoricity as a fea
ture of ethical maxims. Kant famously introduced categoricity as a
distinguishing feature of moral imperatives. But Kantian ethics cer
tainly does not dismiss judgment from ethical thinking; Kant de
votes careful attention to the nature and role of judgment in
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practical reasoning.16 The categoricity Kant has in mind is not
about rules having no exceptions or the irrelevance of the particular
circumstances in which the agent applies them, it is about the
nonexceptionalness of rational agents. That is, on a Kantian view,
categorical maxims apply to all rational agents regardless of
whatever else is true about them. A maxim may be finely honed to
the particularities of a situation, but if it is the sort of maxim that
applies to all rational agents and you are one such agent, then the
maxim applies to you. Applicability in this sense means something
quite specific. It means that the maxim is authoritative: you uncon
ditionally ought to follow it.
I do not wholly embrace Kantian ethics. Even current neo
Kantian moral philosophers recognize Kant's obscurity when it
comes to articulating maxims and testing them for universal
izability.17 But these problems do not arise because of categoricity,
in either Kant's or Simon's sense of the term. The fact that it is
hard to judge what maxim applies to a situation or whether a
maxim can be universalized without contradiction is completely
separate from the maxim's authority (Kant) or context-insensitivity
(Simon). Those who defend the unconditional authority of moral
imperatives need not hold that these imperatives are easily ascer
tained or applied, nor that they must be couched in highly general
terms. The sort of categoricity Kantians have in mind is neither
oversimplistic rigidity nor blushing naivete.
Simon himself never claims that the sort of categoricity he
opposes is the Kantian sort. I have explained the difference
between the two types of categoricity because I believe that Simon
overlooks Kantian categoricity, perhaps due to his fervent hostility
to the sort of categoricity he sees in the Dominant View. His un
derstandable resistance to rigorous, simple-minded, ethical precepts
seems to blind Simon to the need for normativity and specific gui
dance in a theory of practical ethics. Recall that Simon seems
willing to trust individual intuitions about justice to guide attorneys
deciding ethical problems. Before, I raised some general doubts
about the reliability of such intuitions in that setting. Our examina
tion of Kantian categoricity points to a further problem with this
delegation of normative authority.
16. See IMMANUEL KANT CRITIQUE OF JunGMEITT 15-17 (J.H. Bernard trans., Hafner
Publg. Co. 1957) (1788); KANT CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REAsoN, supra note 10, at 81-86
(discussing the operation of pure practical judgment); see also BECK, supra note 10, at 154-63
(explaining Kant's account of judgment in the Critique of Practical Reason).
,

,

17. See BARBARA HERMAN, THE PRACTICE OF MoRAL JunGMEITT 132 (1993) (noting
"endless discussion about how or whether the [categorical imperative] works"); ONoRA
O'NEILL, ACTING ON PRINCIPLE: AN EssAY ON KANrrAN ETHICS 41, 53-91 (1975) (discuss
ing how to apply the categorical imperative).
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Kantian categoricity prohibits ethical exceptionalism. It denies
the special pleading people are so tempted to use to justify their
own departures from moral standards they themselves would
regard as operative. By delegating to individual intuition the job of
identifying justice and its requirements, Simon invites just this kind
of special pleading from lawyers facing ethical problems. If the
point of the Contextual View is to license and encourage lawyers to
respond to justice rather than to unduly rigid ethical precepts, the
advocate of the Contextual View should take a substantive stand on
justice. Otherwise, a system of hard and fast precepts might seem
compelling, especially if such precepts had the effect of limiting the
natural tendency toward ethical exceptionalism.

THE LIMITS

OF JUSTICE

One last concern about the Contextual View: ethics is more
than justice. If Simon is correct that the law's fundamental substan
tive purpose is justice, and this is law's only fundamental substan
tive purpose, then I doubt that the Contextual View can serve as a
complete theory of lawyers' ethics. The Contextual View instructs
lawyers confronted with ethical problems to be responsive to the
law, which in the Contextual View ultimately amounts to being
responsive to justice. But justice is only one ethical end or virtue
among many. Kindness, benevolence, loyalty, and integrity are
some of the others. It may well be that these values are not part of
the law, but it seems strange to exempt lawyers from their com
mands. Requirements of justice can conflict with requirements of
kindness, benevolence, loyalty, and integrity. This is not law's
problem, but it is a problem for ethical theory, which aspires to
deliver a comprehensive account of what people should do, espe
cially in situations where genuine values or virtues push in different
directions. A theory of lawyers' ethics should include this aspira
tion. If it does not - say, because it restricts the lawyer's ethical
obligations to a concern for justice - it threatens to portray the
ethical lawyer as a stunted or fanatical ethical actor, one who
monomaniacally acts to achieve justice, regardless of sacrificing
other values and virtues. This might be a slight improvement on the
Dominant View, according to which the lawyer sacrifices every
other value and virtue to a peculiarly limited kind of loyalty fealty to the client. But it is equally ethically narrow-minded.
CONCLUSION
In the end, this review may demonstrate that the opinions of
your admirers can be more of a pain in the neck than the views of
your detractors. I learned a lot from The Practice of Justice; I
enjoyed William H. Simon's intelligence, and his book inspired me
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to think hard. What thanks does Simon get from such a reader? A
request for a sequel, in which Simon specifies at least some substan
tive principles of justice lawyers ought to heed, and in which he
explains whether, and if so why, justice should be the paramount
consideration in lawyers' ethics.

